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In recent years, the idea that a bidirectional relation exists between physiological 
and psychological processes has become widely accepted. The current data show that 
emotions are inextricably linked to the body, and that an inherent part of having an 
emotional experience is having a physiological reaction. From the perspective of the 
embodied cognition literature the subsequent recall of an event entails at least a partial 
reconstruction of the sensory experience that occurred at the time of the original 
experience. Given this, it seems intuitively reasonable that people’s narratives about 
emotional experiences should reflect people’s physical experiences through the use of 
embodied language. In this study (n = 49) I examined three questions: 1) when, how, and 
to what extent is the body represented in narratives about everyday emotional 
experiences? 2) Is arousal, both self-reported and physiologically measured, when 
initially recalling an emotional memory associated with aspects of how the body is 
represented in a narrative about that memory?  And, 3) does the use of embodied 
language in a narrative about an emotional memory change physiological responding to 
that memory after narration? In considering these questions I found that while the vast 
majority of people use embodied language when narrating about a past emotional event, 
both the amount and type of embodied language used varied dependent upon gender, self-
reported levels of arousal and autonomic nervous system arousal. Specifically, the pattern 
of embodied narration appears to take two distinct pathways. For women a nice adaptive 
  
pattern emerges of higher levels of self-reported anger leading to more embodied 
language use, which leads to lower self-reported and sympathetic nervous system arousal. 
For men, this pattern was not clear, indicating that relation between embodied language 
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People talk about the distressing events in their lives. They share their sad 
moments, their disappointments, the frustrating and the infuriating in an effort to make 
sense of them, to find meaning in them, and to grow from them. In spite of all that we 
have learned about narrative construction over the past 2 decades, specifically about the 
social, emotional, and cognitive processes surrounding it, to date, the study of storytelling 
remains notably disembodied. That is, considering that every experience about which we 
would construct a narrative happens to our physical bodies, and that an inherent part of 
having an emotional experience is having a physiological reaction, to our knowledge, 
little to no systematic work has been done to investigate how people represent their 
bodies in autobiographical narratives, and what the implications for doing so may be.  
Both literal and metaphorical representations of the body are omnipresent in 
literature, across a wide range of writing, from children’s fiction to adult autobiography.  
Consider this passage from the popular children’s book When Sophie Gets Angry, Really, 
Really Angry: “When Sophie gets angry, really, really angry…She kicks. She screams. 
She wants to smash the world to smithereens. She roars a red, red roar, and Sophie is a 
volcano, ready to explode” (Bang, 2004, p. 16).  
Or this passage from the notable neo-Freudian psychoanalyst Karen Horney 




Everything in me is storming and surging and pressing for light that will resolve the 
confusion. I seem to myself like a skipper who leaps from his safe ship into the sea, who 
clings to a timber and lets himself be driven by the sea’s tumult, now, here, now there. He 
doesn’t know where he is going. (p. 232)  
 
As demonstrated by the examples above, both young children and adults rely on 
embodied language and physical metaphor to both understand and communicate their 
emotional experience. In the children’s book, the author links Sophie’s internal emotional 
experience to Sophie’s externalized behavior in a very simple way, using the physical 
metaphor of a volcano to describe the internal experience of anger. On a much more 
sophisticated level, Horney uses the same techniques to represent her feelings of anger. 
Such linguistic representations of embodied experience, defined throughout this paper as 
language that conveys subjective and psychological experience using words and phrases 
that are based on physical, tangible action and experience, are omnipresent in fiction and 
literature and help to make the details of the story vivid for the reader. Throughout the 
remainder of this article, I will refer to these features of narratives with the term 
“embodied language.” 
In spite of the prevalence of embodied language in autobiography and literature, 
from a scientific point of view, we still have really basic questions to answer about when, 
where, and how embodied language is used in everyday narratives.  While the embodied 
cognition literature is investigating the link between physical experience, cognition, and 
behavior in a number of other domains, including language processing, to our knowledge, 
there have been few investigations about the relation between physiological experience 
and narration, and none concerning the use of embodied language in autobiographical 
narratives.  Thus, in this study, designed to be a preliminary investigation into this topic, I 
ask three basic questions:  1) When, how, and to what extent is the body represented in 
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narratives about everyday angry experiences? 2) Is arousal, either self-reported or 
physiologically measured, when remembering an emotional memory associated with the 
use of embodied language during narration of that memory?  And, 3) Does the use of 
embodied language in narrating that memory change physiological responding at re-
exposure to that memory? 
 
When, How, and to What Extent ?s the Body Represented in  
Narratives About Angry Memories? 
 
Narratives are defined as goal structured accounts of past events (Bruner, 1991) 
that range from brief anecdotes (Bamberg, 2006) to fully developed autobiographies 
(McAdams, 2001, 2008; Singer & Bluck, 2001). As individuals construct narratives 
about the events in their lives they interpret and evaluate the storied events, assign 
intention to the actors, delineate the physical and psychological consequences to 
themselves and others, and make meaning of what happened. In so doing, the narratives 
that people construct become much more than factual descriptions of events; they have 
the potential to become the building blocks for identity development (McAdams & 
McLean, 2013; McLean et al., 2010; Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2009), perspective taking (Dunn 
et al., 1987; Fivush, 1991), meaning-making (Conway & Singer, 2004; McLean, 2005), 
and emotion regulation (Pasupathi, 2003; Pasupathi et al., in press; Thompson et al., 
1993).  
While the extant literature does a good job of detailing the varied ways people 
construct narratives and the effects such narratives have on psychological outcomes (e.g., 
increased well-being, the ability to make meaning of an experience, to bring about a 
sense of resolution, etc.) researchers have had little to say regarding how a person’s 
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physical experience at exposure to a memory may impact the features of the narrative 
about that memory.   In other words, the majority of the narrative work to-date focuses on 
the narrator’s psychological experience rather than their physical experience.  For 
example, when narrative researchers talk about a story being “resolved,” they mean that 
the event is resolved psychologically for the narrator, not necessarily resolved in the 
physical, tangible world.  
 It is important to note that in saying that the embodied aspect of narrative has 
not been studied I do not mean to imply that embodiment does not manifest in the 
literature. To the contrary, examples of embodied language in narratives are easy to find 
both within and outside of the psychological literature, as I consider in the next section. 
However, embodied language has yet to be examined as a unique and potentially 
important aspect of autobiographical narratives.  In what follows, I consider the way that 
people’s physical experience may be represented in narratives based on an examination 
of narratives from a broad sample of readings. 
 
Embodied Action Language 
 
Perhaps the most common way that the body appears in narrative is through 
descriptions of the body’s capabilities and actions, what I will call throughout the rest of 
this article, embodied action. While seeming like a necessarily inherent piece of a 
narrative, essential in order to tell a story, the implications of how the body’s actions are 
represented in a narrative may be as psychologically relevant as they are practical. For 
example, consider the following narrative from Olivia: “I run. I know that my body is 
strong and I know that I put a lot of work into keeping it healthy. And so, I'm definitely a 
lot more confident and proud, I guess, now” (Busanich, 2012, p. 312). To Olivia, what 
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she does with her body (run) helps to shape her identity and impacts how she feels about 
herself (confident and proud).   
Ballerina Gelsey Kirkland demonstrates the same phenomenon in her book, 
Dancing on My Grave, when she writes about what it is like for a dancer to recover from 
a debilitating injury. “You can come back and feel quite uncoordinated, like a stranger in 
your own body if you haven’t danced for a while” (Kirkland, 1980, p. 312). Again, what 
the body can do, or in this case can’t do, shapes the narrator’s identity and impacts how 
she feels about herself.  
A slightly more subtle way of portraying embodied action in narrative is through 
the conveyance of specific, sensory details.  Sensory details include sight, sound, touch, 
smell, and taste imply action on the part of the body and serve to envelope both the writer 
and the listener in the narrator’s experience. In this passage, Louie Zamarini describes 
what he experienced after his aircraft was shot down in the Pacific during World War II: 
I found the raft offered an unlikely intellectual refuge. I had never recognized how 
noisy the civilized world was. Here, drifting in almost total silence, with no scents 
other than the singed odor of the raft, no flavors on my tongue, nothing moving 
but the slow procession of shark fins, every vista empty save water and sky, my 
time unvaried and unbroken, my mind was freed of an encumbrance that 
civilization had imposed on it. In my head, I could roam anywhere, and I found 
that my mind was quick and clear, my imagination unfettered and supple. I could 
stay with a thought for hours, turning it about.  (Hillenbrand, 2010, p. 113) 
 
Another way that embodied language appears in people’s narratives is as a 
messenger or purveyor of emotion. Emotions consist of three critical components: 
physiological arousal (autonomic responses), subjective emotional experience, and 
expressive behavior (e.g., facial expressions) (Fridja, 1993). Current emotion theories 
purport that knowledge about one’s emotional state comes in part from the awareness and 
interpretation of physiological arousal (Damasio, 2000; Kever et al., 2015; Niedenthal & 
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Maringer, 2009). From this perspective, it is in experiencing my heart begin to race, my 
mouth becoming dry, my skin turning pale and my gut contracting, that would allow me 
to ascertain that, “I am afraid.”  In other words, in some cases, the experience of emotion 
is bottom-up and it is our physical experiences that serve to inform our psychological 
states. Consider this description of anger written by a 14-year-old female: "I get this 
bubble of rage. I go wild. I feel like crying cause I don’t know how to control myself. It 
happens too quickly. I am angry" (Personal letter). 
In this narrative, it is the girl’s physical experience that both prompts her 
realization of and drives her psychological experience of anger. Therefore, for this story 
to make any sense to a listener, and in order for it to be able to adequately convey the 
narrator’s invisible psychological experience, it must be grounded within a realm shared 
by both the speaker and the listener: the world of physical experiences.  
In other narratives, the body is used to communicate information not to the 
narrator, but to others. This is exemplified in the following narrative written by Sandra, a 
young woman suffering from anorexia nervosa: “It (my weight) was my body’s way to 
tell others that I had a problem, a mental problem. That you don’t feel good about 
yourself” (Nordbø et al., 2006, p. 13) 
Both of these narratives illustrate the central role the body plays in the 
communication of emotion to the self and to others.  Thus, given the importance of 
linguistic representations of embodied experience to the process of accurately and vividly 
portraying emotional experiences, I will examine the presence of physical descriptions of 
felt emotion as an important communicator of embodied state. 
Each of the aforementioned narratives illustrates that without the inclusion of 
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embodied action language narratives would seem incoherent and incomplete (Linde, 
1993; Reese et al., 2011). Coherence then demonstrates one way in which embodied 
language is already implicitly captured in research on narrative (Linde, 1993; Reese et al., 
2011). This is important as coherence is both socially demanded (Linde, 1993) and linked 
to well-being (Baerger, 1999; Waters & Fivush, 2015). The use of embodied action in a 
narrative also contributes to its overall elaborateness, another feature that has also been 
related to meaningful psychological outcomes (Adler et al., 2015; Pals, 2006; 
Pennebaker, 2009).  
Though inclusions of embodied action are fundamental to a complete narrative, it 
is clear that people vary in the extent to which they focus on the embodied aspects versus 
the psychological aspects of experience more emphasized by traditional narrative 
approaches (Pasupathi et al., 2014). Consider the following narrative expressing the 
writer’s grief: 
When I was 17, my dog was ill…I had to be the one to take her to put her to sleep. 
At first I stayed strong, but after we arrived at the vet my heart sank and the tears 
started to flow. At this point I couldn’t hold back the sobs and struggled for the 
next while to keep my composure. (narrative collected in our lab) 
 
The preceding story is filled with embodied language as the narrator strives to 
communicate his cognitive, physical, and emotional experience to the reader. Contrast 
this with another narrative collected about grief: “My friend killed himself and it made 
me feel really sad. I also felt a little guilty. As any friend would because we all think we 
could have prevented it. It was the worst time of my life. Every time I think about it 
makes me sad” (Data collected in lab). 
While the emotional experience of grief is the same in both narratives, the level of 
embodied language use is significantly different. Specifically, in the second narrative, 
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there is no evidence of embodied language use on the part of the narrator, and this may 
have important implications for psychological processes down the road. 
In all of the aforementioned narratives (those about running, dancing, feeling, 
etc.), it is the writers’ descriptions of their embodied action that lay the foundation for the 
more psychologically oriented work typically studied in the narrative literature (e.g., 
exploration, meaning making, identity formation, growth, etc.).  In other words, it is only 
after the preliminary descriptions of the body and its’ physical states are described does 
the narrator delve into the deeper, psychologically oriented work of narrative. Given this 
I believe that descriptions of embodied action may play an important role in building a 




Physical metaphor is another way that people may linguistically represent 
embodied experience. Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) describes the way that 
individuals make sense of abstract concepts, including emotions, by grounding them in 
patterns of bodily actions and manipulations of tangible objects (Gibbs et al., 2006; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 2008).  From this perspective, people use physical metaphor to both 
describe and to understand difficult-to-explain emotions or experiences.  Consider the 
popular colloquialism, heart broken. This is the word that Ron used to describe himself 
after the death of his daughter Mary: 
I am heartbroken. There is always this…sort of an underlying gnawing sensation, 
you know. You feel it in your heart, I think. And that maybe there is a heaviness 
of heart. I sigh that, I don’t know, is very sad that the death happened.  I think that 
I will always carry it with me…It is like a physical presence of a weight bearing 




The physical metaphors used in this paragraph (e.g., heart being broken, a gnawing 
sensation, carrying a burden, the presence of a weight) combine to describe the elusive, 
inexplicable experience of losing a child into a cohesive, contained scenario that most 
readers, though having not lost a child themselves, can relate to.  Importantly, it is the 
claim of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) that the ability of the reader to make sense 
of these metaphors resides in the readers’ automatic construction of a mental simulation 
whereby we imagine performing the bodily actions referred to in the excerpt.  Thus, 
metaphorical references to “carrying a burden” are understood by the reader’s mentally 
simulating what it must be like to carry a heavy weight (Gibbs Jr., 2013; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2008). 
This same linguistic strategy of grounding an elusive, hard to explain 
psychological concept in everyday physical reality, is used in the following excerpt by a 
boxer as he tries to communicate his passion for his sport: 
The boxer willfully perseveres in this potentially self-destructive trade because, in 
a very real sense, he is inhabited by the game that he inhabits . . . a veteran 
middleweight who has rumbled on three continents for over a decade . . . 
[commented], ‘you can’t (give it up) it’s in your blood so much . . . you can’t give 
it up’.  (Wacquant, 2005, p. 88) 
 
The physical metaphors used in this paragraph (e.g., boxing being in your blood; 
inhabiting the sport of boxing) describe the experience of being passionate about a sport 
in a way that most readers, even if not enthralled with boxing themselves, can understand 
(Gibbs Jr., 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008). 
 In sum, embodied action language and physical metaphor are widely evident in 
narratives about personal experience in both research and popular press contexts, and are 
likely related to elaboration and coherence – concepts narrative researchers have studied 
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previously. However, embodied language has not been quantified and examined in its 
own right. The first goal of the present study then was to develop a reliable way of 
quantifying embodied action language and physical metaphor, and to examine the 
prevalence of such language in narratives about everyday emotional experience.  
  Assuming that people will use embodied language and that the prevalence of 
embodied language use will vary across people, as do other more widely studied narrative 
variables (e.g., meaning making, coherence, elaboration), our second question addresses a 
potential reason for that variance, one that is tied directly to the body and its physical 
experience. Specifically, I ask the question, is arousal when initially recalling an 
emotional memory associated with embodied language when narrating that memory?   
 
Is Arousal When Initially Recalling an Emotional Memory Associated With  
Embodied Language When Narrating That Memory? Is This  
Relationship Moderated by Gender? 
 
Self-Report Ratings of Arousal 
 From the discrete emotions perspective, emotions consist of both subjective 
ratings and objective physiological components (e.g., Frijda & Levenson, 1988). Given 
this, we measured both of these parts of the emotional experience and included them in 
this study: the subjective components via self-report ratings of anger, with higher anger 
indicating higher subjective arousal, during each epoch, and the physiological 
components via measures of autonomic nervous system arousal (respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia (RSA) and skin conductance levels (SCL).  I examined each unique 
component and their associations with the use of embodied language separately.   
Given that the self-report ratings of arousal and the physiological ratings of 
arousal do not always move together, I believe that including both reports of arousal is 
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important in the context of this study because people’s interpretations of physiological 
arousal have been shown to vary (Levenson, Carstensen, & Gross, 1994).  In other words, 
while an increase in heart rate may be highly distressing to one individual, necessitating 
the use of a myriad of coping skills, another individual may be relatively undisturbed, or 
even unaware, of the same increase in heart rate.  By looking at the relation between both 
components of a discrete emotion and its relation with the use of embodied language, I 
believe that I will gain a broader perspective on representations of the body in narrative. 
 
Physiological Measures of Arousal 
 
The relation between autonomic nervous system (ANS) arousal and emotion has 
been widely studied (see Levinson, 2014 for a review).  A key premise of functionalist 
theories of emotion is that emotions organize the activity of the ANS and other 
physiological systems and have noticeable effects on bodily states (e.g., Bradley et al., 
2001; Levenson, 1992). From this point of view, emotional experiences are partially 
encoded in our physiological responses to an experience and simply thinking about an 
event invokes the partial reproduction of the autonomic arousal states that occurred 
during the actual event (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2008). Some important 
implications of this for the present study are that (1) emotions are embodied in the form 
of measureable physiological arousal; and (2) far from being incidental, arousal affects 
and shapes information processing, which could be reflected in narratives (Winkielman et 
al., 2015). In this study, I am asking whether or not the physiological states that occur 
when initially recalling an emotional event are related to representations of embodied 




Recalling and Narrating About Emotional Memories 
Physiological Arousal and Language Processing 
 A robust body of past work has demonstrated that physical experience and 
physiological arousal play a causal role in the conceptual and emotional understanding of 
language (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal & Maringer, 2009; Winkielman et al., 
2015). Indeed the evidence supports a relationship between physical states and multiple 
linguistic processes such as lexical access (Borghi et al., 2004), syntactic analysis 
(Chambers et al., 2004) and sentence comprehension (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). For 
example, a smiling participant is quicker to identify a smiling face and pull a lever 
towards them (an approach movement) than a frowning participant (e.g., Frijda, 1986; 
Lang, 1995), and the facial muscles used in smiling (zygomaticus major and orbicularis 
oculi) are more active during the reading of happy sentences than sad sentences 
(Glenberg, 2009). These data suggest that embodied action and physiological arousal go 
hand in hand with the processing and understanding of emotion and language.  By 
extension, I believe that embodied action and physiological arousal could also relate to 
language production in narrating emotional experience. 
Sato, Schafer, and Bergen (2007) took an initial step toward demonstrating the 
effect of embodied action on the use of language. In their study, they relied on the 
common conceptual metaphors of happiness being a thing to search for (e.g., he was on 
the path to happiness) and joy being a container (e.g., his joy was overflowing). 
Experimenters approached individuals in public places (i.e., a grocery store, the library, 
restaurants) who were either searching for something or drinking something. Once 
identified, participants were asked to describe a person in an emotionally ambiguous 
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picture as either “searching for happiness” or being “filled with joy.” A main effect of 
participants’ embodied action immediately prior to their choice showed that participants 
who were engaged in searching behavior used the happiness metaphor 54% more often 
than the joy metaphor (p < .001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test).  This study supports the 
idea that there will be a relationship between physiology and narration such that higher 
physiological arousal might correspond to subsequently using more embodied language 
to narrate an event. 
Other work linking narrative and physiology has been conducted within the field 
of expressive writing. This literature demonstrates that when individuals talk or write 
about emotional events, important biological changes occur (Pennebaker, 1989). For 
example, multiple studies indicate that talking about trauma in the laboratory results in 
changes in participants’ blood pressure, heart rate variability, muscle tension, and skin 
conductance both during and immediately after disclosure; specifically, people show 
decreased levels of arousal across all of these measures. People manifest lower blood 
pressure (McGuire, 2005), lower respiration and heart rates (Pennebaker, Hughes, & 
O’Heeeron, 1987) and lower levels of skin conductance after writing (Francis & 
Pennebaker, 2002). These results have been duplicated across the spectrum of negative 
emotions, from physical pain, to grief, to rage.  From this wide range of possible negative 
emotions that have been shown to exert an influence over a person’s physiological 
functioning, I chose to examine anger in this study.   
 
The Emotion of Anger 
 
I made the decision to focus this study on a single emotion, the emotion of anger, 
in light of the fact that many researchers have provided empirical evidence for distinct 
  
14 
physiological signatures for specific emotions (see Kreibig, 2010 for a review). Given 
that anger may be one of the most physiologically investigated emotions as well as one of 
the most commonly felt (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004), focusing this study on anger 
ensured generalizability across the sample with regards to affective states and provided a 
well-established baseline pattern of physiological responding in anger-eliciting contexts, 
which typically results in decreased RSA (Overbeak et al., 2012), and increases in SCL 
(Fredrickson & Levinson, 1998; Levenson, 1990).  Further, given that anger is one of the 
only negative emotions that is also an approach emotion (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), 
I expected to be able to see activation of both the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
branches of the autonomic nervous system in participants who were reexperiencing an 
angry memory. 
 
Physiological Responding to Emotion 
 
The Autonomic Nervous System 
The role of the ANS in anger response and anger regulation is divided between 
two distinct systems:  the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the parasympathetic 
nervous system (PNS).  Broadly, the SNS serves as a “gas pedal” and mobilizes the body 
to respond to challenges. The PNS system acts as a “brake,” in reducing heart rate and 
restoring baseline levels of arousal. With regards to the systems’ involvement in 
responding to anger, I will consider each of these systems individually.  
 
The Sympathetic Nervous System 
 
Another well-studied psychophysiological marker of ANS functioning is 
electrodermal responses (EDA), composed of tonic levels of skin conductance (skin 
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conductance level) and phasic skin conductance responses (SCR). In this study I will be 
looking specifically at SCL rather than SCR in order to capture the average arousal 
response to an angry memory across a 3-min epoch rather than using tonic SCL upon 
initial recall (Fowles, 1986, 1993)  
 Previous studies investigating SCL and anger have demonstrated that exposure to 
an angry memory amplifies SCL (Denson et al., 2012; Gross, 2002).  This is important as 
it indicates that SCL reactivity has empirically been a good index of how intensely 
arousing a memory is and often signifies how angered the participant is about that 
memory (Levenson, 1992, 2014). 
 
The Parasympathetic Nervous System 
 
  The study of the PNS and its role in anger regulation has often focused on the 
measure of respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) as an indicator of the neurophysiological 
mechanism of cardiac vagal control (De Vries-Bouw et al., 2011; El-Sheikh et al., 2009), 
and it is posited that baseline RSA may denote both an individual’s potential for emotion 
regulation capacity and trait-like levels of arousability (Beauchaine, 2001; Hastings et al., 
2008; Porges, 2007).  Given previous studies of RSA and anger, I expect to find a pattern 
of vagal withdrawal at exposure to an angry memory (Osumi & Ohira, 2009) resulting in 
increased heart rate and lower levels of RSA.  This study examined whether changes in 
physiological arousal when recalling a memory were related to the embodied language 








Physiological Arousal and the Use of Embodied Language 
 
Given the currently available physiological data we believe that there are two 
logical hypotheses regarding the relation between physiological arousal and the use of 
embodied language.  
First, it may be possible that increased physiological arousal at exposure to an 
angry memory may lead to the use of more use of embodied language. Given that people 
perceive emotion in their bodies (James, 1884) physiological arousal could bring along 
with it an increased sensitivity to bodily states and actions. From this perspective, I would 
expect a pattern of decreased SCL and increased vagal withdrawal upon exposure to an 
angry memory, a highly activated emotion, to lead to an increase in the use of embodied 
action words.  This hypothesis is supported by findings that demonstrate that anger is 
primarily an approach emotion used to prime an individual for action (Stemmler et al., 
2007; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  In other words, when the emotion of anger is present, 
the brain organizes our physiological resources in such a way as to activate specific 
physiological adaptations suited to meet the needs of the situation. Thus, when we are 
angry and therefore likely to be preparing to take physical action, people may experience 
an increase in SCL, heart rate, and respiration rates, all bodily responses that prepare us 
to actively engage in confrontation. 
Alternatively, I hypothesized that physiological arousal may be associated with 
the use of less embodied language. This may be because people may opt to use language 
to direct their attention away from their aroused and uncomfortable physical state in favor 
of seeking a more comfortable state of homeostasis. Thus, as participants intentionally, or 
unintentionally ignore their naturally occurring emotions during their narration of an 
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angry memory, SCL immediately after narration would be expected to be higher than 
prior to narration (Fowles, 1980). This is in line with the current literature documenting 
the relation between higher SCL and behavioral inhibition (Pennebaker & Chew, 1985). 
RSA in this situation would be expected to decrease indicating vagal withdrawal.  
 
Is the Relation Between Arousal at Initial Recall and the Use of  
Embodied Language Moderated by Gender? 
 
In addition to testing relations between physiological arousal, self-reported anger, 
and the use of embodied language, I will explore whether these relationships are 
moderated by gender. There are several reasons to anticipate the possibility of gender 
differences. First, the extant data indicate that there is a difference between males and 
females in the degree to which there are physiological changes in response to emotional 
stimuli; specifically, that women respond more strongly to sad states than men, and that 
men react more strongly to angry states than women (Maden, 2000; Verona & Curtin, 
2006). Given that being in a physiologically aroused state congruent with a presented 
emotional situation makes it easier to understand language about that situation (Havas et 
al., 2007), and that emotion states prime preparation for action (Bradley et al., 2001; 
Levenson, 1992), men, who on average become more physiologically aroused upon 
elicitation of an angry memory than women, may manifest a stronger relationship 
between physiological arousal and embodied language within the context of this study, 
which is focused on anger.   
Second, there is some evidence that males and females are different in their 
relative awareness of physiological arousal (Gross & John, 2003; Pennebaker, 1987). The 
proposed rationale for these findings is that men and women differ on their levels of 
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“self-objectification,” defined as the tendency to experience one’s body principally as an 
object to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within 
objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for poorer 
interoceptive awareness in women (Ainley & Tsakiris, 2013; Gottman & Levenson, 
1988), and leads to women becoming estranged from their bodies and their sexualities 
(Bartky, 1990; Tolman, 2002).   
It is also possible, however, that gender will not moderate the relation between 
arousal and the use of embodied language as many previous findings within the 
physiology literature find such gender effects only within the context of complex 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., Gottman & Levenson, 1988, 1992; Leveson & 
Carstensen, 1994; marital interaction in Levenson & Gottman, 1985).  Thus, participants’ 
interpretation of our study protocol will be an important issue. Participants may interpret 
our study to be an interpersonal experience or they may not. Although the anger 
experiences included in this study involved interpersonal anger, the memories were 
recalled in a solitary situation and participants constructed written, not oral narratives, 
about them. Given this, participants may respond in accordance with the literature about 
basic emotional processing, which finds virtually no sex differences (Levenson et al., 
1990; Levenson et al., 1991; Levenson, Oyama, & Meek, 1987; Levenson & Ruef, 1992).  
 
Does the Use of Embodied Language in a Narrative About an Emotional  
Memory Change Self-Reported and Physiological Responding  
to That Memory Upon Reexposure? 
 
 Above, I focused on potential links between physiological arousal when initially 
recalling a memory, self-reported anger when recalling the memory, and the use of 
embodied language when narrating about that memory. This is important because using 
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more or less embodied language when narrating about an emotional autobiographical 
memory might also influence the extent of physiological arousal when participants are re-
exposed to that memory. As stated previously, when individuals are required to narrate 
about emotional experiences, significant changes appear within the body (Pennebaker & 
Hughes, 1987; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). SCL in particular appears to be highly 
responsive to variations in storytelling. Experiments by Buck (1984) indicate that highly 
expressive participants, defined as those who wrote with an open acknowledgment of 
emotion, worked to construct a coherent story, were able to switch perspectives, and who 
expressed themselves openly and honestly, evidenced lower levels of SCL after narration 
than did their less-expressive peers.  Additionally, in term of physiological arousal levels, 
expressive individuals appeared to benefit the most from narrating (Pennebaker & Evans, 
2014).  
This is in line with Fowles’ previously mentioned work alluding to SCL as a 
measure of active inhibition (Fowles, 1980). Specifically, if increased SCL is associated 
with inhibition, it should follow that when an individual discloses an angry memory with 
high levels of emotional expressivity, there should be a decrease in SCL, and that those 
classified as high disclosers, as compared with low disclosers, should evidence the 
greatest decreases in SCL. In this study, I seek to expand this work by emphasizing a 
different type of language than has been examined in the past. Specifically, instead of 
focusing on high levels of emotional expressivity, I will be considering whether those 
that use relatively more embodied language also show a pattern of lower arousal after 
narrating, compared to those that use less embodied language. In accordance with 
previous studies, SCL should be lower at reexposure when participants use more 
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embodied language during narration, as actively narrating in such a manner suggests that 
they are inhibiting less than when they use embodied language.  
 With regards to RSA, our measure of PNS activation, the extant literature 
demonstrates that cardiovascular changes have been associated with both inhibition 
processes as well as general somatic and cognitive activity. This means that changes in 
RSA may be reflective of the cognitive challenge of remembering an emotional event as 
well as reflective of emotional arousal. Nevertheless, Pennebaker et al. (2007) found that 
cardiovascular activity was consistently higher when participants talked about an 
important life event as opposed to a mundane life event, and Bar-Haim and colleagues 
found that children demonstrated greater vagal suppression in response to an emotional 
story containing separation-reunion themes than those that did not (Bar-Haim, 2004). 
These findings hint at interplay between the emotional processing of an autobiographical 
memory and ANS activity. In other words, they suggest that RSA is indicative of more 
than just the cognitive challenge of remembering and narrating an event; they suggest 
that RSA arousal may be an accurate index of emotional arousal. However, none of the 
previous studies considered embodied language or postnarration responding. Given this, I 
will look at both embodied language and postnarration responding in terms of RSA in a 
fully exploratory way. 
 There is a long history of previous research demonstrating that emotionally 
unexpressive adults are more physiologically reactive to a variety of emotional stimuli 
(see Gross, 2002 for a review).  In this study, I begin to look at how using embodied 
language, in addition to the more traditional emotionally expressive language, may also 
be related to physiological responding. Given previous work in this area, I expect to find 
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that the use of embodied language in narratives about angry memories to decrease SCL 





In recent years the idea of an embodied mind has been the catalyst for numerous 
studies exploring the connection between cognitive processes, physiological responding, 
and physical behavior. The current study, asks the following three questions: 1) When, 
how, and to what extent is the body represented in narratives about everyday emotional 
experiences? 2) Is arousal at the initial recall to an emotional memory associated with 
aspects of how the body is represented in a narrative about that memory?  And, 3) Does 
the use of embodied language in a narrative about an emotional memory change self-
reported and physiological responding to that memory upon reexposure? 





















To address these three questions, I made use of two previously collected data sets 
and combined participants assigned to the narrative conditions across samples.  In the 
narrate condition, participants were asked to recall a time when “someone did or said 
something and they ended up feeling angry at that person,” were given time to narrate 
about that event, and then were asked to think about that same event again. Self-report 
ratings of anger were assessed after each epoch of the study. Physiology data were 




Sample One was a group of 30 emerging adults between the ages of 18 and 28 
years who were recruited from the student participant pool and community locations in a 
Rocky Mountain metropolitan area for a study on “social experiences and physiological 
responding.” The data for 1 participant was excluded due to physiological equipment 
failure. The final sample included 29 participants (12 males, 17 females, M age = 21.6, 
SD age = 3.09). Participants identified as European American (78%), Latino/a (7%), 
Asian American (7%), and Pacific Islander (7%). Community members were paid $20 for 
completing the session; students from the participant pool were given the option to be 
paid at the same rate as community members or to receive course credit. Sample Two 
was a group of 21 emerging adults between the ages of 18 and 28 years who were 




3.09). Participants identified as European American (71%), Asian American (14%), 




The primary measures for the study involved physiological responding across the 
exposure, regulation, and reexposure epochs of the experiment. Physiological responding 
was operationalized as electrodermal activity (SCL) and respiratory sinus arrhythmia 
(RSA). The four physiological variables of interest were measured and standardized 
scores computed for each participant individually. I chose to standardize scores for 
individuals rather than across the sample because our hypotheses predicted both increases 
and decreases in our physiological variables of interest dependent upon gender and 
epoch. Thus, if I standardized across the sample and if my hypotheses turn out to be 
correct and I see an increase in one variable for males and a decrease in the same variable 
for females, the numbers would cancel each other out and result in a z score of 0, thereby 
negating any gender effects.  The same argument applies for expected variation by epoch. 
In other words, if scores had been standardized across the sample, important information 
about individual people and their patterns of responding could have been lost.   
 Standardized scores were computed by calculating the standard deviation of each 
participant’s SCL or RSA responding across all epochs (baseline, exposure, and re-
exposure). Difference scores between the individual epochs of interest and baseline were 
then computed and divided by the person’s individual standard deviation (e.g., 
(SCLexposure -SCLbaseline)/SDSCLacrossallepochs). Thus, skin conductance and RSA at exposure 
reflect the person’s individual-level increase or decrease, relative to his or her individual 
baseline and individualized range.  
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Skin Conductance Level 
 
SCL was measured and analyzed using standard procedure for the James Long 
Company (Caroga Lake, NY) equipment and PHY General Physiology Analysis System 
software. Average SCL across each individual epoch was computed as an index of 
sympathetic nervous system arousal. 
 
Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia 
 
RSA was also measured using the James Long Company (Caroga Lake, NY) 
equipment and PHY General Physiology Analysis System software.  Continuous 
recordings of electrocardiogram (ECG) and respiration were amplified and filtered 
through a 4-channel bio amplifier, with the ECG channel high pass filter set to .1 Hz and 
a low pass filter set to 1000 Hz.  
 
Self -Report Measures of Anger 
 
Self-reported emotion ratings were assessed at baseline, exposure, immediately 
following narration, and following the reexposure epochs of the experiment. Specifically, 
participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1, which represented “Not at all” to 7, which 
represented “The most I’ve ever felt,” how angry they were feeling at the present 
moment. Means and standard deviations by epoch are presented in Table 1.  
 
Embodied Language Coding System 
 
The narratives were coded for the presence of embodied language, specifically 
embodied action and physical metaphor. Embodied action was defined as something that 
the narrator did with their body. Examples include, “I ran, I cried, I jumped, I ate.” The 
second category of embodied language was physical metaphor. Physical metaphor was 
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defined as language that makes sense of abstract concepts, including emotions, by 
grounding them in patterns of bodily actions and manipulations of tangible objects. 
Examples include, “I was heartbroken,” “I had butterflies in my stomach,” and “I was 
lighter than air,” See Table 2 for examples and full descriptions of each code.  Each 
instance of embodied language was flagged and one point assigned to the narrative. Thus, 
if a narrative read, “I went to the library and read a book,” it would have received a score 
of “2” because the narrator described doing two things with their body. The primary 
investigator coded all the narratives in Study 1 and then randomly selected 30% of the 
narratives to be coded by a trained research assistant who was blind to the hypotheses of 
the study in order to establish reliability of the coding systems. The coding system for 
presence of embodied language was deemed reliable with a 99% agreement rate between 
first author and the research assistant, (κ = .96), indicating that both coders found the 
same instances of embodied language use in the narratives 99% of the time. Thus, out of 
367 instances of embodied language used, the coders agreed on 363 of them. 
 Four narrative variables were then derived from these codes. First, I computed an 
“Overall Embodied Language” score. For this variable, all instances of embodied 
language use were summed, divided by total word count in order to control for length of 
the narrative, and then multiplied by 100 to yield more easily conceptualized numbers. 
Because physical metaphor is well investigated and written about in the embodied 
cognition literature we decided to look at it separately as well as part of the broader 
category of embodied language. Thus, we computed an “Overall Physical Metaphor” 
variable by summing the total number of physical metaphors coded in a narrative and 
dividing by word count, then multiplying by 100. The variable “Embodied Action 
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Focused Language” was created to represent the percentage of total embodied language 
use that consisted of embodied action language. Thus, the total number of embodied 
action codes were summed and divided by the sum of all embodied language references. 
The fourth narrative variable, “Physical Metaphor Focused Language” was created to 
represent the percentage of total embodied language use that was comprised of physical 
metaphor. Thus, the total number of physical metaphors were summed and divided by the 




Participants were asked to refrain from consuming alcoholic or caffeinated 
beverages and from smoking cigarettes for 2 hours prior to the experiment. On arrival, 
after consent procedures, participants washed their hands using Ivory soap and were 
hooked up to the physiological recording equipment.  
Once hooked up to the physiological recording equipment, participants rated 
emotionally neutral landscape photos during a 3-min vanilla baseline task. They then 
completed a 4-min paced breathing baseline task. After obtaining our baseline data, 
participants were exposed (initial exposure) to the angry stimuli. After a 1-min rest 
period, participants were asked to regulate their anger by writing a narrative about that 
stimulus (regulate), and after another 1-min rest period they were reexposed (immediate 
reexposure) to the memory (see Figure 1). 
 
Initial Exposure 
For the autobiographical memory stimulus, participants were asked to “remember 
a recent, specific time in your own life when you felt very angry about something.” The 
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prompt continued with the instructions, “Now I want you to spend a few minutes 
remembering the event in detail. Just concentrate on reliving the event in your mind. Go 




During the regulate epoch, participants were told to “Write about your own 
experience that you just recalled. Write about what happened, how you felt about it, and 




After narrating, reexposure to memory was prompted as follows, “Now think 
again about that specific time when you felt angry. Spend some time remembering the 
event in detail. Just concentrate on reliving the event in your mind. Go back to the 
moment when you felt the most angry and stay there.”  
 
Conclusion of Study 
 
After the reexposure epoch, participants were unhooked from the SCL and RSA 
equipment. Participants reported how long ago this angry memory had occurred. They 


































































Descriptive Statistics for Self-Reported Ratings of Anger and Physiological Arousal 
 Whole Sample Men Women 
Epoch Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Exposure       
Self-Reported 







SCL .99 1.04 .99 1.24 .99 .93 
RSA -1.22 .84 -1.17 .62 -1.25 .96 
Regulation       
Self-Reported 
Anger 3.33 1.76 2.53 1.58 3.83 1.70 
SCL -7.22 22.96 -15.70 34.44 -1.67 6.43 
RSA -5.96 6.97 -3.81 3.56 -7.33 8.22 
Reexposure       
Self-Reported 
Anger 3.31 1.64 3.42 1.77 3.23 1.57 
SCL 1.33 1.41 1.29 1.45 1.36 1.40 























Embodied Coding System 












Actions done with the 
narrator’s body; 
Descriptions of the 
narrator’s body that would 
indicate to them that they 






“I walked away” 
“I said” 
“My eyes went all red. 
Everything I saw had a 
red tint” 
My body felt tense and 
my throat felt swollen 
“I become disoriented” 
 
Physical Metaphors 
Phrases that describe 
emotional experiences as 
physical experiences 
“We were closer than 
blood felt” 
“We weren’t on the same 
page” 
My world was flipped 
upside down 
“I was upset” 
“He destroyed every last 























Overall Analytic Strategy 
 For all the analyses that follow I examine correlations for the whole sample and 
then separately for males and females. Given that traditional significance testing can be 
very conservative when using a small sample size such as ours (N = 49), and our project 
is exploratory in nature, we will focus below on reporting effect sizes (Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2001), the advantage of which is that the reported value is independent of the 
sample size used to perform the significance test (Abelson, 1995). Thus, any effect sizes 
that meet the threshold of a moderate effect (.30) and larger will be reported (Cohen, 
1988). I will refer to these effects as “noteworthy” for the purpose of this paper. 
 
When and How Do People Use Embodied Language?  
Does This Vary by Gender? 
 
There was a wide range in each of our narrative variables of interest as shown in 
Table 3. While women used slightly less overall embodied language than men, as shown, 
the observed difference was not significant, t(47)= -.547, p=.58.  Additionally there were 
no significant differences between men and women and the use of physical metaphor 
t(47)= .85, p=.67. These results demonstrate that there are large individual differences in 
both the amount of embodied language that people use in narratives about emotional 
events and the type of embodied language that they use (e.g., embodied action, physical 
metaphor, etc.), although these differences are not associated solely with participant 
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gender.  What do such individual differences look like at the level of the overall 
narrative? Below, consider examples of narratives with low and high levels of embodied 
language and physical metaphor. Phrases that were coded for use in the statistical 
analyses are underlined. 
Low-embodied language: 
My friend killed himself and it made me feel really sad thinking about it.  I also 
felt a little guilty.  As any friend would-because we all think we could have 




The memory I had recalled was about me finding out that my ex girlfriend had 
been cheating on me while she was at boot camp.  My friend and I had been 
talking, and she revealed that my ex told her that rumors about her having sex 
around base were true.  I was angry and hurt.  My eyes went red, all I could see 
had a red tint.  It was the angriest I had ever been.  I ran around, tried not to hit 
things or scream, because although I was extremely mad, I remained logical.  
Don’t hit things; you’ll hurt your hand.  It meant a lot to me.  My world was 
flipped upside down.  I had meant to marry this girl, and the fact that she cheated 
on me made me very angry, very upset and insecure.    
 
Low physical metaphor: 
It was just me and my dad at home and we got into argument round 11:00 pm 
over prayers and I left home and drove to Walmart crying and decided not to 
come back, I was very angry but like after half hour I decided to come back home 
and talk with them. I kind of felt guilty leaving the house, but at the same time it 
was also a good lesson for my dad. 
 
High physical metaphor: 
I thought about when my ex-boyfriend recently broke up with me and called off 
our future he promised. I was devastated and it’s still hard to process. It felt like 
my life was over. I felt broken and so sad. It meant change and the end of 
something that meant so much to me. I had to start a new life, rethink my plans 
and face a scary new reality that is still hard to deal with sometimes because I still 





Is Arousal When Initially Recalling an Emotional Memory Associated  
With Embodied Language When Narrating That Memory? 
 
Self-Reports of Anger at Exposure 
Across the entire sample, no correlation between anger at exposure and embodied 
language met my effect size criterion. For men, self-reported anger was negatively 
correlated with the amount of embodied action focused language used relative to the 
overall amount of embodied language in the narrative, and positively correlated with the 
amount of physical metaphor focused language used relative to embodied language 
references.  This means that the more anger a man reported at exposure to his memory, 
the less his narrative emphasized embodied action, relative to overall amount of 
embodied language he used. Additionally, the more anger that a man reported at exposure 
to his memory, the more physical metaphor his narrative emphasized relative to overall 
amount of embodied language he used. For women, there was a positive relationship 
between self-reported anger at exposure to a memory and overall embodied language use. 
This means that the more angry a woman reported feeling upon exposure to her memory 
the more embodied language she used in her narrative about that memory (see Table 4).  
 
Physiological Arousal to Anger at Exposure 
 
SCL and RSA Arousal at Exposure  
Across the entire sample there were no noteworthy relations between SCL or RSA 
arousal at exposure and the use of overall embodied language or overall physical 
metaphor.  This was also the case for men and for RSA arousal in women (see Tables 5 
and 6). For women, however, the higher SCL at exposure to the angry memory, the more 
the narrative contained physical metaphor, relative to narrative length, and to overall 
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embodied language. In other words, women whose initial SCL arousal to their anger 
memory was higher used more physical metaphor in their narratives (see Table 5).  
 
Does the Use of Embodied Language in a Narrative About an Emotional  
Memory Change Arousal to That Memory Upon Reexposure? 
 
Postnarration Self-Reports of Anger 
  Self-reports of anger immediately following narration, and following reexposure 
to the angry memory were examined while controlling for anger at exposure; thus, the 
reported effects represent relations between embodied language variables and the extent 
to which self-reported anger was higher or lower than expected based on initial anger at 
exposure (see Table 4). 
For the whole sample, and for both men and women, there were no noteworthy 
relations between embodied language and anger immediately after narrating.  
For the sample as a whole there were no noteworthy associations between self-
reported anger at reexposure to the memory and the embodied language measures.  For 
men, at reexposure, self-reported anger was higher than expected when men used more 
overall physical metaphor. However, inspection of scatterplots revealed that this 
relationship was driven by one male participant who used extensive physical metaphor 
relative to the whole sample. For women, the more physical metaphor a woman used in 
her narrative about an angry memory the lower her self-reported anger after narrating.  
This negative relationship was also found for physical metaphor focused language (see 
Figure 2). This means that the more of a woman’s overall embodied language use 
consisted of physical metaphor focused language, the less angry she reported being at 
reexposure to that memory, relative to her anger at exposure. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
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once about half of women’s embodied language was physical metaphor, she reported 
feeling better at reexposure, than at exposure. Correspondingly, there was a positive 
relation between embodied action focused language and self-reported anger such that the 
more embodied action focused language a woman used, relative to her overall embodied 
language use, the higher her self-reports of anger than expected upon reexposure to that 
memory (see Figure 3). 
 
Physiological Arousal Postnarration 
 
 Physiological measures of arousal at reexposure were examined while controlling 
for arousal levels at exposure; thus, the reported effects represent relations between 
embodied language measures and the extent to which SCL arousal or RSA arousal were 
higher or lower than expected based on initial arousal at exposure.  
Across the whole sample and for men, there were no correlations between SCL 
arousal at reexposure, and the four embodied language measures. For women, however, 
there was a negative relationship between the amount of embodied action focused 
language used during narration and SCL arousal at reexposure such that the greater the 
percentage of a woman’s overall embodied language use that consisted of embodied 
action focused language, the lower than expected, her SCL at reexposure (see Table 7). 
As demonstrated in Figure 4, those women where embodied action focused language 
comprised approximately 60% and greater of their embodied language use showed the 
most benefit in SCL arousal at reexposure.  
For the relationship between embodied language use and RSA arousal at 
reexposure, again there were no reportable effect sizes across the sample as a whole or 
for women. For men only, there was a negative relation between the use of overall 
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physical metaphor and RSA arousal at reexposure indicating that the more overall 
physical metaphor a man used in narrating about an angry memory, the higher than 
expected his RSA at reexposure to that memory (see Figure 5). There was also a relation, 
for men only, between physical metaphor focused language and RSA arousal at re-
exposure such that the greater the percentage of overall embodied language used in his 
narrative about an angry event that was physical metaphor focused, the higher a man’s 
RSA upon reexposure to that memory (see Table 8), though upon inspection of 

















































Figure 4.  













Figure 5.  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5  
Pearson’s Correlations and 95% Confidence Intervals for Narrative Measures 



















 Total Sample Males Females 
Overall embodied language .15 .20 .10 
95% CI [-.12, .39] [-.12, .52] [ -.36, .47] 
Overall Physical metaphor .20 .12 .30 
95% CI [-.03, .41] [-.28, .51] [.03, .54] 
Embodied action focused -.04 -.01 -.25 
95% CI [-.37, .11] [-.40, .30] [-.60, .18] 
Physical Metaphor focused .07 .01 .41 





















Table 6  
Pearson’s Correlations and 95% Confidence Intervals for Narrative Measures and RSA 
at Exposure, Standardized for Individuals 
 Total Sample Males Females 
Overall embodied language -.03 -.15 .03 
95% CI [-.25, .17] [-.48, .18] [-.27, .33] 
Overall Physical metaphor -.06 -.13 -.03 
95% CI [-.26, .14] [-.67, .16] [-.29, .33] 
Embodied Action Focused .01 .01 .02 
95% CI [-.20, .13] [-.22, .64] [-.34,  .31] 
Physical Metaphor Focused         .00 -.04 .06 





















Partial Correlations and 95% CI’s for Narrative Measures and SCL at Reexposure, 
Controlling for SCL at Exposure 
 Total Sample Males Females 
Correlation with overall embodied language -.12 -.24 -.05 
95% CI [-.40, .17] [-.66, .27] [-.50, .29] 
Correlation overall physical metaphor .07 .07 .07 
95% CI [-.21, .27] [-.57, .45] [-.22, .31] 
Correlation embodied action focused 
language -.18 -.25 -.31 
95% CI [-.36, -.02] [-.52,.36] [-.51, -.04] 
Correlation physical metaphor focused 
language .11 .20 .05 




































Table 8   
Pearson’s Correlations and 95% Confidence Intervals for RSA at Reexposure, 
Controlling for RSA at Exposure 
 Total Sample Males Females 
Correlation with overall embodied language .15 .09 .13 
95% CI [-.08, .35] [-.28, .46] [-.14, .42] 
Correlation with overall physical metaphor -.11 -.38	 .01 
95% CI [-.36, .24] [-.68, .15] [-.34, .37] 
Correlation embodied action focused 
language .19 .32 .00 
95% CI [-.18, .37] [-.61, .41] [-.36, .38] 
Correlation of physical metaphor focused 
language -.18 -.31 .00 

























The Use of Embodied Language in Narrative. 
 
The hypotheses of this paper were informed by the idea that people’s narratives 
about emotional experiences could reflect their physical experiences through the use of 
embodied language.  My first goal in this study was to quantify and describe the 
prevalence of embodied language, defined as language that conveys subjective and 
psychological experience using words and phrases that are based on physical, tangible 
action and experience in narratives about angry events.  I found that I was able to reliably 
identity and classify embodied language. However, the use of embodied language, while 
present in the large majority of narratives (96%), was not uniformly distributed across the 
sample (Range=0-36 coded embodied language uses) or across types of embodied 
language.  
 
Self-Reported Arousal at Exposure and the Use  
of Embodied Language 
 
Given the wide range in variability in both the amount and type of embodied 
language used, my second and third questions examined several factors that could be 
contributing to these differences. Specifically, I began by asking if arousal at exposure to 
a memory contributed to the use of embodied language. With regards to self-reported 
anger, for women, more intense anger at exposure was linked to more overall embodied 
language usage.  This finding suggests that the more angry a woman is upon exposure to 
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a memory, the more the body is present in a woman’s narrative about that memory. This 
is in line with our hypothesis, that increased arousal would correlate with an increase in 
embodied language use, and in line with current thinking within the embodied cognition 
literature that a bidirectional relationship exists between strength of the somatosensory 
simulation and subjective reports of emotion (Barsalou, 2008).  In other words, a strong 
subjective rating experience of anger may make a person more sensitive to the physical 
experience of anger, and in turn, relate to emphasizing that experience in their narrative 
through the use of embodied language.   
For men, self-reported anger at exposure was related to the use of less embodied 
action focused language, relative to overall embodied language use. This finding appears 
consistent with our second hypothesis regarding arousal and embodied language use, 
specifically that when aroused, some individuals may use language to direct attention 
away from their bodies.  
 
Physiological Arousal at Exposure and the Use of  
Embodied Language 
 
Physiological arousal at exposure, in addition to self reported arousal at exposure 
was also linked to greater usage of certain types of embodied language for some people. 
Specifically, for women, SCL arousal at exposure to a memory was linked to the higher 
use of overall physical metaphor and physical metaphor focused language, relative to 
total embodied language use. Again, this fits with our hypothesis that the more 
physiologically aroused an individual was at exposure to an angry memory, the more 
embodied language they would use during narration. However, this finding also 
contradicts the previous findings regarding men’s increased bodily awareness. This is a 
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signal that relations between gender, physiology, and the use of embodied language are 
complex and not straightforwardly consistent with a simplistic idea about gender.  
 
The Use of Embodied Language and Self-Reported Arousal 
at Reexposure 
 
My third question involved considering the relation between the amount of 
embodied language used during narration and arousal upon reexposure to that memory. I 
hypothesized that people who used more embodied language would be less aroused at re-
exposure than they were at exposure, and my data suggests that I was partially correct in 
this thinking. Specifically, this hypothesis was true for women. In other words, the more 
overall physical metaphor a woman used during narration of an angry event the less 
angry she was relative to expectations, at reexposure.  By contrast, the more overall 
physical metaphor a man used during narration of an angry event, the angrier he was 
relative to expectations, at reexposure to that memory.   
 
The Use of Embodied Language and Physiological Arousal 
at Reexposure 
 
With regards to physiological arousal at reexposure and its relation to the use of 
embodied language, there were no noteworthy effects across the entire sample for either 
SCL or RSA.  However, for men only, physiological arousal at reexposure, in terms of 
RSA, was negatively associated with the use of overall physical metaphor and physical 
metaphor focused language, relative to the total amount of embodied language used.  
Specifically, the more physical metaphor a man used in his narration of an angry event, 
the less RSA arousal he manifested upon reexposure to that memory. Thus, as a man’s 
level of anger shifts, so does his RSA. This pattern of vagal withdrawal in response to 
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emotion is consistent with previous work documenting that RSA has been shown to 
accompany shifts in emotional experience (Appelhans, et al., 2006; Beauchaine, 2001; 
Porges, 1995; Porges et al., 2006).  
For women only, SCL arousal at reexposure was negatively associated with 
embodied action focused language relative to overall embodied language use. In other 
words, the more embodied action focused language that a woman used the lower her SCL 
at reexposure. This finding is in line with previously mentioned work associating lower 
SCL arousal with disclosure (Pennebaker, 1989).  Thus, the more embodied details of her 
memory a woman includes in her narrative, the lower her SCL at reexposure to that 
memory. 
In sum, the type and amount of embodied language used in a narrative about an 
angry experience varied along with initial arousal, but not in easily predictable and 
patterned ways. Instead the use of embodied language and arousal appears to be 
inextricably linked with gender.  Specifically, for men, self -reported arousal is related to 
more physical metaphor use during narration, and more self-reported anger at re-
exposure, while for women, greater SCL arousal at exposure and greater embodied 
language use during narration are related to less self-reported arousal after narration.  
 
The Importance of Gender 
 
An important implication of these findings is that the way people represent their 
bodies when telling stories about previous anger experiences is linked to gender. My 
findings show that gender influences not only if and when a person uses embodied 
language, but also what type of embodied language they will use.  Gender also appears to 
influence what the implications for using embodied language will be for later emotional 
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and physiological arousal.  
In general, the pattern of embodied narration appears to take two distinct 
pathways. For women the pattern of arousal at exposure, embodied language use and 
arousal at reexposure shows a nice adaptive pattern with increased arousal at exposure, 
leading the use of more embodied language, leading to lower self-reports of anger and 
lower SCL responding at reexposure (see Figure 6).  For men the pattern is not as 
adaptive. For men increased sympathetic nervous system arousal increases the amount of 
physical metaphor use, which, in turn, is associated with to vagal withdrawal, and 
increased self-reports of anger.  
These distinctive patterns of narration may develop for a couple of reasons. First, 
beginning in early childhood, girls are exposed to more elaborated talk about negative 
emotions than are boys (Fivush et al., 2000), and boys, more so than girls, come to expect 
negative consequences for expressing emotion (Fuchs & Thelen, 1988). Thus, women 
may be more accustomed to using narrative to down regulate emotion than are their male 
peers, while men are more accustomed to using narrative to justify their emotions. Thus, 
as men narrate, they may be explaining to themselves and their audience why it is okay 
for them to be feeling the way that they are. 
Another possibility has to do with our cultural and highly gendered interpretation 
of anger.  Anger is classified in both Greek and Roman taxonomies of emotion as a 
positive feeling, linked to manly pride and the opportunity to avenge wrongdoing. By 
contrast, for women, anger is often linked to shame and a sense of being “unladylike.”  
Thus, when given the opportunity to narrate about their angry memory, females used that 
chance to down regulate the emotion and constrain it into what would be considered 
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“socially appropriate” bounds while men used language to help align their physical 
arousal with their emotional arousal, thus maintaining high levels of arousal, both self-
reported and physiological, at reexposure. 
 
Physical Metaphor Is a Distinct Type of Embodied Language 
 
Another interesting finding to come out of this study is that physical metaphor is a 
distinct and important subtype of embodied language, behaving differently in most of our 
analyses than embodied action language.  This may be because embodied action language 
is a direct, less cognitively taxing way of reporting experience, while the use of physical 
metaphor is a unique form of meaning making. In other words, embodied action is a 
report of veridical information about the actions of the body in the past.  By contrast, I 
believe that as people describe their physical experiences using metaphor, they imbue it 
with judgment, assign it value, and make meaning of it.  Thus, while embodied action 
language is a summary report of what happened, the use of physical metaphor is a unique 
way of making sense and meaning of the event being narrated.   
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 In terms of limitations, our greatest was that of sample size and power. 
Specifically, our sample was too small for correlational work. Thus, given that the 
phenomena I observed all varied by gender, in order to fully detect and explore these 
relationships, I would need a much larger sample size.  
Future research in this area should be devoted to better understanding physical 
metaphor as a distinct type of embodied language and a unique form of meaning making 
necessitating its own line of thought and research that integrates the fields of embodied 
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cognition and narrative. Additionally, future research should investigate the interplay 
between gender and the use of embodied language. Specifically, given the gender 
differences found in our study, it appears that further study of embodied narrative could 
contribute greatly to our understanding of how the meaning making process unfolds 
differently for men and women.  
From the embodied cognition perspective all our meaning, thought and language 
emerge from the experience of embodied activity (Johnson, 2007). Thus, our attempts at 
rational understanding and meaning making may be best served, not by attempts to 
escape or ignore our bodily experience, but rather by embracing it and using it to further 
our understanding of ourselves.  Given that a large majority of people uses embodied 
language when narrating about a previous emotional experience, we submit that our 
physical experience is an integral, yet heretofore understudied part of narrative research. 
To quote Gabrielle Roth, “Your body is the metaphor of your life…It is your Bible, your 
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